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Gibbes: The Judiciary and the Rule-Making Power

NOTES
THE JUDICIARY AND THE RULE-MAKING
POWER
"If we would preservefree government in America, we must make
free government, good government. Nowhere does government
touch the life of the people more intimately than in the
administrationofjustice; and nowhere is it more important that
the governing process be shot through with efficiency and with
common sense."'
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Judicial administration" connotes many things to many people;
suffice it to say that the term, relatively unknown one hundred years
ago, is now a part of the vocabulary of almost everyone associated with
the legal profession. Judge Stanley H. Fuld, Chief Judge of the Court
of Appeals of New York, has succinctly summarized what judicial
administration represents:
The concept of judicial administration as an indispensable
tool in the prompt and efficient disposition ofjudicial business has
achieved wide acceptance in the United States. More and more,
the Federal and State judicial systems have come to recognize
that, although the operation of a court system may not be
completely equated with the management of a business, there are
many methods and procedures utilized in private enterprise that
can be adapted to service the courts and thereby, the People.
Trained administrators, data processing, computerization, inservice training programs, personnel structures, continuing
objective and professional evaluation of court operations-all
have a place in achieving betterment of the administration of
2
justice, a goal we all seek.
The goal is thus improvement in the process through which and by
which the business of the courts is carried on; the tool, judicial
administration. 3
1. Bennett,

VIRGINIA LAW VEEKLY,

DICTA, Vol. XIX, No. 7 at 4 (1966), quoting

from 27 A.B.A.J. 71 (1941).

2. Fuld, Introduction:Observations on JudicialAdministration,36 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 329 (1970).
3. "There are no inherently protracted cases, only cases which are unnecessarily
protracted by inefficient procedures and management." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND
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There has been little disagreement as to the necessity for
modernization of existing administrative structures, methods, and
objectives, nor has there been a basic dispute as to the mechanics of
such modernization. Where conflict has arisen is in the determination
of who has the power to provide for the proper administeration of
justice; who has the power to determine what changes are
administratively necessary and desirable; who has the power to effect
and implement those changes in court organization, structure, and
personnel which are found to be judicially expedient. At the center of
this controversy has been the rule-making power of the judicary-that
is, the power of the courts to promulgate rules to provide for the proper
and efficient administration of the business of the judicial branch of the
government. Because this power-its existence, scope, and effect-is of
such critical importance in any discussion of judicial administration,
this note will examine the rule-making power of the judiciary as that
power exists today.4
II.
A.

THE RULE-MAKING POWER

Source

In an often-quoted address before the Conference of Bar
Association Delegates in 1926, Roscoe Pound, Dean of the Harvard
University School of Law, referred to the four stages of judicial rulemaking in England:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

rule by custom of the court;
procedure governed by rules of court;
procedure governed by legislative decree; and
a return to procedure governed by rules of court. 5

MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION II (West Publishing Co. 1970) (for use with FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE by C.A. Wright and A.R. Miller).
4. For a discussion of the historical background of the rule-making power see R.
Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926) and A.
VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 91-145 (1949), the
latter of which contains a state-by-state analysis of the rule-making power of the
judiciary. See also, Note, JudicialRule Making: Proprietyof Iowa Rule 344ff), 48 IOWA
L. REv. 919 (1963).
The scope of this note has been purposely limited to the subject of rule-making
becaue of the vast wealth of scholarly materials dealing with statistical data pointing to
the necessity for improvement in judicial administration and the mechanics of judicial
administration.
5. R. Pound, The Rule-Making Power of The Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926).
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The transition from the first stage to the second represented a mere
maturation and formalization of court procedure. The second
transition occurred because of a need for reform during a period when
the.legislative body enjoyed a position of ascendancy and acted where
the judiciary had failed to act. The final transition-that is, a return of
the rule-making power to the courts-took place when the legislative
body recognized that the judiciary was peculiarly suited and
empowered' to promulgate and implement its own rules of procedure to
meet the changing demands of judicial administration.
Analogizing between the situation in England when the final
7
transition took place and the situation in the United States in 1926,
Dean Pound called for a return of the rule-making power to the courts
and the judicial branch in the United States because
[e]xperience shows abundantly that regulation of procedure by
rules of court is the way to insure a simple effective procedure,
attained by gradual and conservative overhauling and reshaping of
existing practice. It shows that in this way new demands upon the
machinery of judicial administration may be met promptly by the
ordinary means of legal growth instead of waiting vainly for years
for intervention of the legislative deus ex machina.8
What Dean Pound recognized in 1926 was that conservative judicial
rule-making could be more immediately responsive to the changing
demands of judicial administration than could the slower legislative
process which, though tempered by deliberation, can in many cases act
only after a problem has existed for some length of time.
6. Dean Pound declared: "In truth procedure of courts is something that belongs to
the courts rather than the legislature, whether we look at the subject analytically or
historically." Id. at 601.
7. While energetic in his call for a return of the rule-making power to the judiciary,
Dean Pound urged restraint in pursuit of that goal:
It may be that today, after seventy-five years of codes and practice acts and
prolific procedural legislation, we can't go so far as to pronounce such
legislative interference with the operations of a coordinate department
unconstitutional.
Id. at 601.
8. Id. An excellent example of the judiciary's ability to overhaul and reshape
existing rules of practice promptly so as to insure a sound and expeditious judicial process
was the adoption of amendments to South Carolina Circuit Court Rules 44, 87, and 89
by the General Convention of Justices and Judges on August 28, 1970. Where the
judiciary has the power to alter or amend its own rules of procedure-here, power
granted pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-16 (1962)-the judiciary can make changes
required by judicial decision, legislative decree, or the demands ofjudicial administration
in a prompt and efficacious manner.
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With the above background -legislative preemption of the rulemaking field, a call for a return of the rule-making power to the
judiciary or an assertion of the inherent rule-making power of the
courts by the judiciary, and a persuasive argument for exercise of the
rule-making power by the judiciary-the basic problem remains:
power. Who has the power to make rules of procedure for the judicial
branch of the government? Because the constitution of each state must
be the ultimate source of the judicial power in that state, 9 a general
discussion of the rule-making power is of minimal value; rather, three
examples of various types of constitutional situations may usefully be
studied. 0
9. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 120 (1940).
Except in so far as authorized by the constitution, the legislature
cannot abolish, divide, reorganize, or consolidate constitutional courts nor
alteror diminish the essentials ofjurisdiction, functions, orjudicialpowers
conferred on such courts.
Id. at § 122 (emphasis added). In the comment to the above, the commentator states:
Hence, the universally recognized rule that, except in so far as it is
authorized to do so by the constitution, the legislature cannot . . .
abrogate or abridge their inherent powers or functions.
Id. at 182-83. Based on the above distinction, the court, in Adams v. Rubinow, 157
Conn. 150, 251 A.2d 49 (1968), distinguished between "constitutional courts" and
"lower courts" and found that, as to the former, the legislature could make no rules of
procedure but that, as to the latter, the legislature has full rule-making power. Id. at 17172, 251 A.2d at 56.
S.C. CONST. art. V, § I provides in part:
§ 1. Judicial power vested in certain courts.-The Judicial power of this
State shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in two Circuit Courts, to wit: A
Court of Common Pleas having civil jurisdiction and a Court of General
Sessions with criminal jurisdiction only. The General Assembly may also
establish County Courts, Municipal Courts and such Courts in any or all
of the Counties of this State inferior to Circuit Courts as may be deemed
necessary, but none of such Courts shall ever be invested with jurisdiction
to try cases of murder, manslaughter, rape or attempt to rape, arson,
common law burglary, bribery or perjury: PROVIDED, Before a County
Court shall be established in any County it must be submitted to the
qualified electors and a majority of those voting must vote for its
establishment.
There would thus appear to be a similar distinction between constitutional courts and
lower or inferior courts in South Carolina; whether the distinction holds true as to
allocation of rule-making power has not been expressly decided.
10. Where the constitution of a particular state expressly grants and defines the rulemaking power accorded to the judiciary under that instrument, the problem of rulemaking power is relatively insignificant. The extent of such a grant of power would, of
course, be determined by the constitutional provision. Consider the Alaska Constitution
which expressly gives the supreme court the rule-making power but with the proviso that
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First, where the constitution is silent as to the rule-making-power
and the court has refused to assert or recognize an inherent rule-making
power, the legislature has either preempted the judiciary in the rulemaking field and has codified rules of judicial procedure or has
expressly granted rule-making power to the state courts by statute."
Thus, in Fair v. State" the Georgia court forthrightly acknowledged
that its rule-making power stemmed from a 1945 legislative enactment
and that the court possessed no residuary inherent powers which would
3
authorize it to make rules governing its own procedure.
Second, where the constitution of a particular state is silent on the
subject of rule-making power and the legislature desires to return the
rule-making power to the judiciary or the legislature has granted rulemaking power to a court which has asserted its inherent power in the
area, a compromise has frequently been reached. Content with
possession of rule-making power, the courts have avoided friction
between the different branches of government by a diplomatic assertion
that the rule-making power is "neither exclusively legislative nor
judicial"' 4 or that such power is both statutory and inherent. 5
Third, where the constitution is silent and the legislature has either
"[t]hese rules may be changed by the legislature by two-thirds vote of the members
elected to each house." ALASKA CO sT. art. IV, § 15. In Zeege v. Martin, 379 P.2d 447
(Alas. 1963) the Alaska court stated:
Judicial power to make rules of practice and procedure is not
absolute. The legislature may change rules initiated by the judiciary when
the desirability of making a change is evident ....
Id. at 450.
11. See Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pac. Coal and Oil Co., 340
S.W.2d 548 (Tex. 1960) (where the court cites the legislative grant of rule-making power
to the judiciary and states that such grant was made to aid in the administration of justice
and to avoid unnecessary delay and expense in the judicial process).
12. 220 Ga. 750, 141 S.E.2d 431 (1965).
13. Id. at 752, 141 S.E.2d at 433. In Fairthe Georgia court did, however, construe
the 1945 enactment more liberally than it had in an earlier decision, Wilson v. State, 215
Ga. 775, 113 S.E.2d 607 (1960), and decided that under the legislative grant of rulemaking power the court could make a rule governing motions for new trials in criminal
cases. Id. at 752, 141 S.E.2d at 433. Thus, while the Georgia court has expressly held that
it has no inherent rule-making power, the court has asserted itself under the legislative
grant of power and has expanded the area in which the judiciary can exercise its power.
14. State v. Gibson Circuit Court, 239 Ind. 394, 399, 157 N.E.2d 475, 477 (1958).
The court noted that the rule-making power was granted to the judiciary by a legislative
body which wished to fix responsibility for promulgation of rules of procedure in one
place. Id. at 400, 157 N.E.2d at 478.
15. Shettles v. State, 209 Tenn. 157, 352 S.W.2d 1 (1961).
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failed or refused to grant rule-making power to the judiciary or has
granted only limited rule-making power to the judicial branch, the
courts have asserted their inherent power to make rules governing
procedure. The New Hampshire court has stated its position in this
manner:
The inherent rule-making authority of courts of general
jurisdiction in this state to prescribe rules of practice and rules to
regulate their proceedings "as justice may require" has an ancient
lineage supported by consistent custom, recognized by statute and
enforced by numerous judicial precedents. .

.

.The matter has

been succinctly summarized by a careful legal historian in the
following language: "Thus, the rule-making power was firmly
established over three hundred years ago. A statute in 1701
confirmed the ancient power which has never been lost." Page,
Judicial Beginnings in New Hampshire, 1640-1700, p. 43 (1959)."
Perhaps the most cogent argument which supports an assertion of
inherent rule-making 1ower in the judiciary is that based on a
separation of powers theory. In Craft v. Commonwealth 7 the
Kentucky court examined the relationship existing between the
legislature and the judiciary with respect to the rule-making power. The
court stated:
[I]t has generally been recognized that courts (even without
express authority given by the constitution, statute, or rule of a
supreme court of a state) have inherentpower to prescribe rules to
regulate their proceedings and to facilitate the administration of
justice.
When we say that an express constitutional grant of rulemaking power is unnecessary we do not mean that the rule-making
power does not flow from that instrument. The fountain source of
that power is in the act of division of powers among the three
branches of the government. . . and the grant ofjudicial power to
the courts by the constitution carries with it, as a necessary
incident, the right to make that power effective in the
administration of justice.'
The court concluded:
16. Garabedian v. Donald William, Inc., 106 N.H. 156, 157, 207 A.2d 425, 426
(1965).
17. 343 S.W.2d 150 (Ky. 1961).
18. Id. at 151 (emphasis added).
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Thus, the circuit court and this court have the power fo
formulate rules for the fair administration of justice aside from
additionalgrantor limitation by the legislature.19

The assertion of an inherent rule-making power residing in the

judiciary and flowing from a constitutional guarantee of separation of
powers is an extremely appealing approach: first, the rule-making

power of the courts would thus have a distinct constitutional base, and,
second, the position of the judiciary as a separate, coordinate, and

equal branch of government is enhanced by such assertion. Most
important, the concept of a strong judiciary with adequate power to
deal with its own internal problems of administration is fostered by
such an approach.
As Dean Pound urged, there has been a return of the rule-making

power from the legislature to the judiciary. The precise route, whether
by legislative decree or by assertion of inherent power, is certainly not
so important as the end result-a judiciary with the power, the rule-

making power, to use the tool, the concepts of judicial administration,
to achieve the goal, the betterment of the process through which the
20
business of the courts is carried on.

19. Id. at 152 (emphasis added). While the Kentucky court asserted its inherent rulemaking power even against possible limitation by the legislature, the court did recognize
that on some occasions statutes and rules of court would conflict. Id. at 151-52. See Part
II-E infra for a more detailed discussion of this problem. In deference to the legislature
and statutory law several courts which promulgate rules under their inherent powers
assert their power as did the West Virginia court in State v. Davis, 141 W. Va. 488, 93
S.E.2d 28 (1956):
"Courts have inherent power and authority to prescribe and enforce
rules and regulations for the conduct of their business in accordance with
established procedure, not inconsistent with organic or statutory law, nor
unreasonable, oppressive, or obstructive of common right."
Id. at 493, 93 S.E.2d at 31, quotingfrom Teter v. George, 86 W. Va. 454, 103 S.E. 275,
276 (1920).
20. In South Carolina the judiciary clearly possesses rule-making power, but
whether the origins are purely statutory, purely inherent, or a hybrid species is somewhat
unclear. In Carolina Glass Co. v. State, 87 S.C. 270, 69 S.E. 391 (1910), affd 240 U.S.
305 (1916), in holding a purported legislative conferral of judicial power on a state
commission unconstitutional, the South Carolina Supreme Court delineated and defined
the constitutionally guaranteed concept of separation of powers. The court decided:
The Constitution ordains (article 1, § 14) that "the legislative, executive,
and judicial powers of the government shall be forever separate and distinct
from each other, and no person or persons exercising the functions of one
of said departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other."
This language is as strong as it is simple and clear. The Legislature
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therefore cannot assume to itself the exercise of judicial powers. .

.

.Nor

can it confer "judicial powers," in the sense in which those words are used
in the Constitution, upon any other body than the Courts mentioned and
provided for in section 1, art. 5 of the Constitution, which provides that
"the judicial power of this state shall be vested in" the courts therein
specifically mentioned and provided for.
87 S.C. at 290, 69 S.E. at 398. The court continued.
It would be difficult to give an exact definition of the words "judicial
power" as used in the Constitution, which would be applicable to all cases
which might arise, and we shall not attempt it. The lines of demarcation
between the powers of the three departments of government are often
shadowy and illusive; but in the main they are clear, well defined, and well
understood.
The Constitution assumed the existence of an organized society, and
when it vested the judicial power in the courts, it had reference to the
judicial power then existing, and such as the people then understood to be
vested in and exercised by the courts.
There can be no doubt or difficulty as to those powers, which, from
the earliest periods in the history of our constitutional forms of
government, have been exercised by the courts in the due and orderly
interpretation andadministrationof the law.
Id. at 291, 69 S.E. at 399 (emphasis added).
And in Brown v. Piedmont Mfg. Co., 109 S.C. 343,96 S.E. 138 (1918), the court, in
overruling exceptions to the trial judge's overruling the defendant's motion for a new trial
because the defendant made neither a motion for a nonsuit or for a directed verdict,
declared:
This Court has a right in the orderly conduct of business to frame
rules as to how the question of raising points shall be made, and the
manner in which they are to be first made, and in so doing it is not a denial
of right, but simply a question of practice, and inherently in the power of
the Court to adopt.
Id. at 347, 96 S.E. at 138 (emphasis added).
In spite of such an assertion of inherent power, the court has consistently held that
rules of court must fall if in conflict with a statute, State v. Cottingham, 224 S.C. 181,77
S.E.2d 897 (1953), and has consistently recited statutory authority for rules promulgated
by the supreme court.
For relevant statutory sections, see S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-16, 10-17, 15-144, 15231, 15-447, and 15-616 (1962).
In 1969 the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted seven additional circuit court
rules; Professor James Dreher reports:
On May 8, 1969, the Supreme Court Justices and Circuit Judges took
a remarkable step forward by adopting seven additional Circuit Court
Rules which, for the first time, allow effective pretrial discovery procedures
in the South Carolina courts. ...
The authority for the promulgation of these rules is recited as Code
Section 10-16, although it could be argued that some of them violate the
limitation of that Code Section that rules adopted pursuant to it should not
be "inconsistent with" the statutory law. . . . When the rules were
announced there were a few speeches made in the General Assembly to the
effect that the Court was exceeding its authority in adopting the rules, but
no real effort was made to abrogate them.
The action of the Court is particularly impressive in that on several
occasions in the past Bar Association groups have attempted to persuade
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Scope

The general rule is that rules of court govern procedure and cannot
affect substantive law.2' Rules of court should logically be directed
toward control of court procedure and matters of judicial
administration; such rules should not be promulgated or used to deny
to a party a substantive right created by the legislature.?
the General Assembly to pass discovery statutes modeled on the Federal
Rules and have failed in those efforts. The Court's unilateral move into a
field which had been rather generally assumed to belong to the legislature,
may be read as an intentional assertion, against challenge if need be, of the
Court's inherent power to make rules as to all aspects of the conduct of
litigation before it. We do not know, of course, whether the court intended
to make this broad assertion of power or not, but, if it did, the doctrine is
one which has always had the strong support of students of government.
We are told that historically it was widely accepted and applied throughout
the American States until Jacksonian Democracy brought in the
ascendency of the legislature. Much has been written on the subject which
it would be pointless to repeat. Most simply put, advocacy of the
judiciary's inherent power to make the rules for conducting litigation rests
upon two basic arguments, one a matter of principle and the other a
practical one. The principle is the separation of governmental powers. The
practical argument is that the judiciary, with its legal training and
experience, would naturally know what procedures work best in litigation.
Our overall conclusion must be that substantial improvements in the
administration of justice are possible in South Carolina under the present
Constitution through wise rule-making by the Court itself. This is true no
matter whether the power is an inherent one or one delegated by the
legislature under Code Section 10-16 and similar statutes. The General
Assembly shows no inclination to diminish its grants of this authority.
J. DREHER, STAGE ONE STUDY 77-79 (1971 (hereinafter referred to as DREHER). STAGE
ONE STUDY is a currently unpublished report prepared for the Institute of Judicial
Administration by Professor James Dreher of the University of South Carolina School
of Law, with the assistance of Professor Glenn Abernathy of the University of South
Carolina Political Science Department. The study is an excellent unbiased and critical
report on "the court system now existing in South Carolina and the changes which may
be effected in it, if found desirable, under three different documents: The present
Constitution of 1895, the Judicial Article proposed by the Committee to Make a Study of
the South Carolina Constitution, and the Model Judicial Article supported by the
American Bar Association." Id. at I. The STAGE ONE STUDY delineates various
alternative changes which might be made in the judicial system of South Carolina with
respect to (I) court structure; (II) judges; (IlI) administration; (IV) rule making; and (V)
finances. Id. at 4-5. This report does not however, make recommendations as to
preferable choices among the alternatives discussed; such recommendations are expressly
reversed until a pending empirical study of the court system is completed. Id. at 1.STAGE
ONE STUDY is here cited and quoted in part by and with the consent of the authors and
the Institute, to whom the South CarolinaLaw Review expresses its appreciation.
21. See, e.g., Richey v. Richey, 389 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1965). See also State v.
Romes, 74 N.J. Super. 520, 181 A.2d 560 (1962).
22. In re Templeton, 399 Pa. 10, 159 A.2d 725 (1960).
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In the procedural area, however, the rule-making power may and
should be forcefully used to control the order, the flow, and the
timeliness of the business before a particular court. Many articles have
been written and speeches given decrying the inequities of a system of
jurisprudence where a case may remain on a docket untried for two,
three, or more years. Such argument need not be reiterated here; the
point has been made over and over. Nor should one assert naively that
the rule-making power is the one answer to the problems of judicial
delay and crowded dockets. But the rule-making power is historically,
logically, and properly to be used toward a solution to this problem.
In Ham v. Staten the court, considering a request for trial of a
certain case out of the regular order because of hardship, stated:
Every litigant has a right to the trial of his case in the regular
order and this is a "substantial right". . . of which he may not be
deprived arbitrarily without violating the due process doctrine
... .Within this framework, and inherent in courts, is the power
of the court to control the order of its business-"This power has
been recognizd as judicial in its nature, and as being a necessary
appendage to a court organized to enforce rights and redress
wrongs" ....24
And in William A. White &Sons v. Doelger the court, in denying
a motion to vacate an order of dismissal after the plaintiff's counsel
refused to accept an assignment of the case for trial, 6 declared:
It is within the Court's inherent and statutory power to
control the order of its business . . . and the assignment of the
cases on the calendar cannot be subjected to the arbitrary acts of
counsel.2Y
In Holm v. State2s the Wyoming court, while recognizing that a court
in the exercise of its rule-making power "cannot enlarge or abridge
substantive rights,"' ' stated:
23. 185 N.Y.S.2d 940, 18 Misc. 2d 356 (1957).
24. Id. at 942, 18 Misc. 2d at 358, quotingfrom Riglander v.Star Co., 98 App. Div.
101, 90 N.Y.S. 772 (1904), affd 181 N.Y. 531, 73 N.E. 1131 (1905).
25. 232 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962).
26. Dismissal was ordered only after the case had been continued at the plaintiff's
request from February 27, 1962, to April 16, 1962, to May 7, 1962, to May 16, 1962, to
May 23, 1962. Id. at 3. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-142 (1962) (order and priority of
hearing cases).
27. 232 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
28. 404 P.2d 740 (Wyo. 1965).
29. Id. at 743.
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Courts have inherent power to control the course of litigation and
to adopt suitable rules therefor. . . This means, of course, it is
not within the power of the legislature to prescribe how courts
shall perform their functions any more than courts can prescribe
how the legislature or executive officers shall perform their
functions.-'

Thus, within the realm of procedural matters subject to the rulemaking power-indeed, at the very heart of such matters-lies the
complex problem of control of the order, the flow, and the timeliness of
business transacted before a court.
Generally, the courts in the exercise of their rule-making power
control matters of pleading, practice, and procedure. 3' The scope of the
rule-making power, however, is defined largely by the substantiveprocedural distinction, and only the more modern judicial articles
prescribe precise lines between rules governing pleadings, those
32
governing practice, and those governing procedure.
C. Substance v. Procedure
Definition of a precise line between substance and procedure has

always been difficult. In related areas apart from judicial rule-making,
courts have proceeded on a case-by-case basis and have decided

substantive-procedural issues within the context of a concrete factual
situation. In the rule-making area, a similar pattern has developed
30. Id. See also Robbins v. Campbell, 65 I11.App. 2d 478, 213 N.E.2d 641 (1965)
and People v. Lobb, 17 I11.2d 287, 161 N.E.2d 325 (1959).
31. Professor Dreher categorizes judicial rules as follows:
(I) Rules of administration -when courts will be held, what records are
to be kept, what reports made, etc.;
(2) Rules of procedure-the filing of pleadings, the conduct of the trial
itself, the mechanics of the appeal, the final disposition of the cause, etc.;
(3)

Rules governing the practice of law-

.

. ; and

(4) under some modern judicial articles, such as the ABA Model, rules
establishing the composition and jurisdiction of lower courts.
DREHER, supra note 20, at 73-74.
See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-96 (1962) which provides in part:
The inherent power of the Supreme Court with respect to regulating
the practice of law

. . .

is hereby recognized and declared. The authority

conferred on that court in §§ 56-96 to 56-100 shall be deemed as
cumulative thereto.
32. See Thews v. Miller, 255 Iowa 175, 121 N.W.2d 518 (1963) (where the court,
noting that inferior courts cannot adopt rules contrary to supreme court rules in a
particular state, can adopt local rules to govern areas in which supreme court rules are
not applicable).
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which makes particularized case study more desirable than generalized
or abstract definitions.

In Heat Pump Equipment Co. v. Glen Alden Corp.3thecourt was
faced with the issue of whether a rule relating to service of process was
procedural and hence within the rule-making power of the judiciary.
Using a separation of powers argument, the court announced that
[riules of practice and procedure governing the courts have
been considered in this State to be essentially judicial in nature,
with the power to make them inherent in the courts on the basis of
the State Constitution which distributes the powers of government
among the legislative, executive, and judicial departments . . .
and vests the judicial power of the state in the Courts. . . .
The court then stated:
"The test must be whether a rule really regulates
procedure,-the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for disregard or infraction of them."''
Holding that a rule relating to service of process was procedural, the
court noted, however, that even procedural rights might be substantial
rights; thus, substantive and substantial would not always be exact
equivalents.8 Of importance, the Heat Pump court made emphatically
clear that the rule-making power of the judiciary-the power to govern
"procedure"-was not cut off merely because a matter of procedure
was significant or substantial.
In State v. DistrictCourt37 the issue before the court was whether a
rule requiring service of a demand for jury trial upon the other parties
was "one of procedure and. . . governed by the rules."8 Answering in
the affirmative, the court discussed the distinction between substance
and procedure.
Distinction between procedure and substance has not always
been easy, as is amply demonstrated in Federal cases where the
court was exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of
33. 93 Ariz. 361, 380 P.2d 1016 (1963).
34. Id. at 363, 380 P.2d at 1017.
35. Id. at 364, 380 P.2d at 1017, quotingfrom Sibbach v. Wilson &Co., 312 U.S. !,
14 (1941).
36. 93 Ariz. at 364, 380 P.2d at 1018.
37. 399 P.2d 583 (Wyo. 1965).
38. Id. at 585.
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citizenship of the parties. 1 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice
and Procedure, §§ 8 and 138 (1960); 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil
Procedure § 25. This is true in other fields, 52 C.J.S. Law, p.
1026; 1 C.J.S. Adjective Law, p. 1468. However, as bears upon
matters such as the one before us, the statement in Kellman v.
Stoltz, N.D. Iowa, I F.R.D. 726, 728 is significant:
* * * It may * * * be assumed that the term 'substantive
law' is not mathematically exact, but as respects both the terms
'procedure' and 'substantive law' there is a possible twilight zone.
Examination of many authorities leads me to conclude that
substantive law as constitutionally, legislatively and judicially
recognized, includes those rules and principles which fix and
declare the primary rights of individuals as respects their persons
and their property, and quite generally as fixing the type of remedy
available in case of invasions of those rights. As to the term
'procedure', I conceive it to include those rules and forms
applicable in the administration of the remedies available in cases
of invasion of primary rights of individuals in Courts or other
lawfully constituted tribunals and agencies. Such rules include
both pleading and practice, including all rules and forms which
govern the parties, their counsel and the Court throughout the
progress of the case from the time of its initiation until final
judgment and its execution. ***" More specific to the present
question the court said in Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill. 591, 114
N.E.2d 686, 689, that "procedure" is the machinery for carrying
on the suit, including pleading, process, evidence, and practice,
and held that a statute relating to the proper method of obtaining
jurisdiction in respective instances was a part of the law of
procedure and not of substantive law. Similarly, in the case before
us, the question of the requirement of serving upon the other
parties a demand for a trial by jury is one of procedure and is
governed by the rules. 39

Again, a substantial requirement was involved, but one found by the
court to be procedural in nature and subject to the rule-making power.
Another procedural area of increasing importance in both federal
4
40
and state courts has been that of discovery. In Ames v. Ames the

New Jersey court discussed the proper disposition of the rule-making
power in such cases.
Depositions are a form of discovery, and discovery falls into
the field of practice andprocedure, over which the Constitution of
39. Id.
40. See notes 8 and 20 supra.
41. 89 N.J. Super. 267, 214 A.2d 544 (1965).
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1947 granted exclusive jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, entirely
free from interference from the legislature, which latter body,

however, still remains supreme in the making and changing of
substantive law. . . . That grant of power, in Art. VI, Sec. II,
par. 3 of the Constitution, stating that "The Supreme Court shall
make rules governing. . . the practice and procedure in all such
courts," effectively deprived the Legislature of the power to

prescribe in which courts discovery should and should not be
allowed. Such power is in the exclusive possession of the Supreme
Court, which has in its rules given the deposition power to several
of the courts

. . .

and at the same time impliedly denied it to this
2

[uvenile] court by its silence.
While the precise rule announced by the Ames court might not apply
under state constitutions which reserve to the legislature control over
inferior courts,4 3 discovery is generally deemed procedural and subject
to the rule-making power of the court, whether statutory or inherent. 4
Slagle v. Valenziano'5 is a case which presents a closer question as
to where the line between substance and procedure will be drawn.
There, a trial court had, pursuant to statutory authority to adopt local
rules, promulgated a rule which allowed the court in its discretion to
dismiss a case without notice when a case had remained on the docket
for four full terms of court without any action in the case." The
appellate court, while recognizing that there was early authority for
dismissal for want of prosecution absent statutory grounds for such
dismissal, relied on later authority and held that "a court has no
inherent or common law power to dismiss an action except for lack of
jurisdiction and. . . an involuntary nonsuit may not be ordered in the
absence of statutory authority therefor."' 7 Of significance, the court
based much of its argument on the assertion that a substantial, if not
substantive, right was abrogated by the rule. 8
In a concurring opinion in Slagle one judge, however,
distinguished the rule in question from a similar rule which would
provide for notice before dismissal and a reasonable period for
reinstatement after dismissal. He intimated that such a rule would not
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 273-74, 214 A.2d at 548 (emphasis added).
See note 9 supra.
See note 20 supra.
134 Ind. App. 360, 188 N.E.2d 286 (1963).
Id. at 362, 188 N.E.2d at 286-87.
Id. at 364, 188 N.E.2d at 287.
Id. at 365, 188 N.E.2d at 288.
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only be valid but should be used to control the order of business in the
various trial courts:
I believe that trial courts should have some control over the
"old dog cases" that have stagnated and clogged their dockets for
long periods of time for reasons that are beyond and outside the
knowledge of the trial court and unless the courts do have some
control over such delinquent actions we would be saying in effect
that such negligence, procrastinations, delays and laches in the
pursuit of the prosecution of their causes of action must be
rewarded ."9

He continued:
In most jurisdictions the right to dismiss for lack of
prosecution is recognized as an inherent right of the trial
courts ...
"The elimination of delay in the trial of cases and the prompt
dispatch of court business are prerequisites to the proper
administration of justice. Those goals cannot be attained without
the exercise by the courts of diligent supervision over their own
dockets. Courts should discorage delay and insist upon prompt
disposition of litigation."
While the Slagle court may have been technically correct, the opinion
of the concurring judge suggests that the line between substance and
procedure may often be more accurately determined in rule-making
cases by looking at the purpose behind the rule-" 'whether the rule
really regulates procedure ..
'"
If the rule "really regulates
procedure" and is administratively efficacious, a court would do well
to look twice before automatically classifying the subject of the rule
49. Id. at 368, 188 N.E.2d at 289 (concurring opinion).
50. Id. at 368, 188 N.E.2d at 289-90 (concurring opinion), quotingfrom Sweeney v.
Anderson, 129 F.2d 756, 758 (10th Cir. 1942).
51. Heat Pump Equip. Co. v. Glen Alden Corp., 93 Ariz. 361, 364, 380 P.2d 1016,
1017 (1963), quotingfrom Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
See also, State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 79 Nev. 280, 382 P.2d 214 (1963)
(rule-making power does not extend to questions of jurisdiction absent specific grant of
power); Tiffany v. O'Tool Realty.Co., 52 Del. 83, 153 A.2d 195 (1959) (rule requiring
substitution of a proper party within two years of the death of a party under penalty of
dismissal is a rule of procedure and within the rule-making power; where statute granting
state court rule-making power is identical to statute grainting federal courts rule-making
power, reasoning in federal cases is persuasive in question as to state court rules); and
State v. Terry, 51 Del. 458, 148 A.2d 102 (1959) (rule fixing deadline for filing petition
for recount of ballots is procedural and within the rule-making power of both courts and
administrative tribunals).
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substantive because of a prior determination in an area other than the
rule-making area.
D. Power to Appoint MinisterialOfficers
Corollary to the rule-making power of the judiciary is the power of
the courts to appoint ministerial officers to aid the court in providing
for the effective administration of justice. The power to make rules and
the power to appoint administrative assistants and the like may
properly be considered together, since both are necessary and desirable
where the judicial branch of the government is to be strong enough to
work toward improvement of the judicial system.
The Florida court in Blitch v. Buchanan," discussing the power of
the courts to appoint ministerial officers, stated:
In view of section 27, article 3, of the Constitution, governmental
functions requiring independent judgment, discretion, and
authority can in general legally be exercised only by officers who
are elected by the people or appointed by the Governor, unless
otherwise provided or permitted by the Constitution. .

.

. There

are exceptions to the above general rule, as, for example the

statutory and inherent power of a competent court to appoint
suitable persons to perform functions in the court or to execute its
orders and mandates, when no officer is available for that purpose,
to the end that the court may not be hindered or rendered impotent
in the complete exercise of its judicial functions. ' 3
And in State v. St. Louis County" the Missouri court, noting the
inherent power of the judiciary as a separate, coordinate, and equal
branch of government to "do all things that are reasonably necessary
52. 100 Fla. 1202, 131 So. 151 (1930), affd 100 Fla. 1242, 132 So. 474 (1931).
53. 100 Fla. at 1204, 131 So. at 154 (citations omitted, emphasis added). The
general rule has been stated in this manner:
Apart from statute, a court of general jurisdiction, of record, or of last
resort possesses the inherent power to provide the necessary attendants and
assistants as a means of conducting its business with reasonable dispatch
21 C.J.S. COURTS § 142(c) (1940).
"In addition, in the absence of contrary legislation courts have
inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments
required for the performance of their duties, including authority to appoint
persons to aid the court in the performance of special administrative or
judicial duties."
Id. at § "140(a).
54. 451 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. 1970).
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for the administration of justice," 55 declared that the "court has
inherent and constitutional authority to employ necessary personnel
with which to perform its inherent and constitutional functions
The power to appoint officers to aid in the administration of
justice is, however, meaningless unless there is some source of funding
to pay the salaries and expenses of these officers. The St. Louis County
court thus continued: "The court has inherent and constitutional
authority . . . to fix the salary of such personnel, with reasonable

standards, and to require appropriation and payment therefor."' 7 The
court stated:
The right to appoint a necessary staff of personnel necessarily
carriers [sic] with it the right to have such appointees paid a salary
commensurate with their responsibilities. The right cannot be
made amenable to and/or denied by a county council or the
legislature itself. . . .The arm which holds the scales of justice
cannot be shackled or made impotent by either restraint,
circumvention or denial by another branch of that government. s

The Missouri court then held:
When, however, conventional sources do not provide necessary
funds, the court does have inherent authority to do those things
essential to the performance of its inherent and constitutional
functions. 59

Once again, the better path lies in cooperation between the
legislative, the executive, and the judicial branches of the government.
While separation of powers serves a very practical purpose-that is,
55. Id. at 101.
56. Id. at 101. See In re Walter Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920) (power of federal
district court to appoint auditor).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 102.
59. Id. The rule has been stated in this manner:
Subject to statutory and constitutional restrictions, a court has
inherent power to incur such expenses as may be requisite to the proper
performance of its duties.
21 C.J.S. Courts § 14 (1940). In the comments to § 14 the commentator notes that a
court cannot, however, remain open when funds have been exhausted in the face of a
constitutional provision that prohibits municipal indebtedness beyond revenues for a
particular year. Id. § 14 at 28. See also State v. Becker, 351 Mo. 769, 174 S.W.2d 181
(1943) where the court summarized:
"The courts have the inherent powers and authority to incur and order
paid all such expenses as are (reasonable) necessary for the holding of court
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that of checks and balances-and while much of the inherent power of
the courts is founded in such theory, "cooperation" among the
branches of government is as basic a precept as is "separation," and
mutuality of purpose best fosters the goals and objectives of each
branch.
Thus, while there is assertedly inherent power in the courts to
appoint ministerial officers, whether the power be inherent, statutory,
or constitutional, the better rule would seem to be that stated in Leahey
v. Farrell":
[While] [i]t
is well settled that the legislature may not
encroach upon the judiciary in the administration of justice...

[c]ontrol of statefinances rests with the legislature, subject only to
constitutional limitations. .

.

.The function of the judiciary to

administer justice does not include the power to levy taxes in order
to defray the necessary expenses in connection therewith. It is the
legislature which must supply such funds. .

.

.But the successful

and efficient administration of government assumes that each
branch will cooperate with the others."
Through such a rule the judiciary loses none of its power of
appointment but looks to the historical source of state funds, the
and the administration of the duties of courts of justice." . . . The
limitation on the courts' inherent power is that the expenses incurred or the
thing done must be reasonably necessary to preserve the courts' existence
and protect it in the orderly administration of its business.
Id. at 778, 174 S.W.2d at 183, quotingfrom Schmelzel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 16
Idaho 32, 35, 100 P. 106, 107 (1909).
60. 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949).
61. Id. at 54, 66 A.2d at 578-79 (emphasis added). See also Laughlin v. Clephane,
77 F. Supp. 103 (D. Col. 1947).
In South Carolina the supreme court has stated:
It is fundamental that the appropriation of public funds is a legislative
function, Const. 1895, art. X, § 9, and therefore beyond the power of the
Grand Jury . .

.

. It is likewise beyond the province of the judiciary,

perforce Article 1,§ 14 of the Constitution.
Gregory v. Rollins, 230 S.C. 269, 274-75, 95 S.E.2d 487,490 (1956). In Fosterv. Taylor,
210 S.C. 324,42 S.E.2d 531 (1947) the court noted, however, that "It]here is a reciprocal
duty upon the legislature to respect the judgments of the court." Id. at 333, 42 S.E.2d at
536.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7.1 (1962) (whereby the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court is made the administrative head of all the courts in the state). See also S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 15-111, -112, and -113 (1962) (which govern appointment of a messenger and
an attendant, a reporter, and a clerk respectively).
For an excellent discussion of court administrators-their history, use, and
prospectus-see Bennett, VIRGINIA LAW WEEKLY, DICTA, Vol. XIX, No. 7 at I (1966).
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legislature, for appropriation of monies to pay the reasonable and
necessary expenses of appointive ministerial officers.
E.

Effect

Where a court exercises its inherent or statutory rule-making
power, what effect does the rule promulgated have? Basically, rules of
court have the effect of law, 6 2 but, where a rule of court conflicts with a
statute, the statutory provision will prevail.
There is a line of authority among courts which have asserted their
inherent rule-making power to the effect that rules of court prevail in
spite of contrary legislation. In Craft v. Commonwealth" the court
announced:
"So long as the rules of practice fixed by the legislature
accord with the proper and effective administration ofjustice, they
should be, and they are, followed to the letter. No other rule will
accord with the duty of each of the three branches of government
so to coordinate its administration as to carry into effect the
For proposed South Carolina constitutional provisions relative to court administrators,
see

FINAL REPORT: COMMITTEE TO MAKE A STUDY OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA

1895 art. V, § D (1969).
An interesting question in this area of judicialpower is whether the judiciary can
order physical facilities erected, modernized, or improved in an effort to improve the
administration of justice. Consider the remarks of Chief Justice Walter H. McLaughlin
of the Massachusetts Superior Court at the Midwinter (1971) meeting of the
Massachusetts Bar Association.
May I remind the County Commissioners that our Supreme Judicial
Court is a constitutional court. It derives its powers, as does also the
Legislative and Executive branches of government, from the people in
whom finally rests all powers of government. The inherent power of the
Court to manage the Judicial branch of government has never been
severely tested in this Commonwealth. I do not profess to speak for the
Supreme Judicial Court in the exercise of its power of superintendence of
the entire Judicial branch of government. It is not, however, beyond the
realm of probability that the day may come when, by reason of continued
default of those vested by statute with authority to provide courthouse
facilities, the Supreme Judicial Court may put on their hard hats and do
the job themselves.
Address by Chief Justice Walter H. McLaughlin, Massachusetts Bar Association
Midwinter Meeting, January 23, 197 1.
62. Trahan v. Petroleum Cas. Co., 250 La. 949, 200 So. 2d 6 (1967); State v.
Atterberry, 129 S.C. 464, 124 S.E. 648 (1924).
63. State v. Cottingham, 224 S.C. 181, 77 S.E.2d 897 (1953); Grecian Gardens, Inc.
v. Board of Liquor Control, 2 Ohio App. 2d 112, 206 N.E.2d 587 (1964).
64. 343 S.W.2d 150 (Ky. 1961).
CONSTITUTION OF
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purpose of the Constitution. Where, however, a situation arises in
which the administration of justice is impaired or the general rules

of practice are unworkable the duty undoubtedly rests on the
courts to draw upon the reserve of their inherent power, not in the
assertion of a domination over other co-ordinate branches of
government, but in co-operation with the legislative and executive
branches to carry out the purposes of the Constitution."' 3

And in State Bar Association v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. 6 the
court, discussing separation of powers and rules governing the practice
of law, declared:
Courts acting in the exercise of common-law powers have an
inherent right to make rules governing procedure in them ...
The Supreme Court of Errors, established by the state
constitution, likewise has the inherent power, independent of and
despite any statute,to make rules governing procedure before it."

Thus, the exercise of inherent rule-making power by the judiciary
arguably carries with it a comparable supremacy of judicial rule over
statute so long as the rule is within the power of the judiciary to make
constitutionally.
What becomes of paramount importance where judicial
administration is concerned is that the courts have not only rulemaking power but rule-making power of sufficient breadth to allow the
judiciary to act completely and coherently within the procedural
sphere. The assertion of inherent rule-making power, based on the
Craft type of case discussed above, provides a broader base for
innovative rule-making; however, where a legislature sees the wisdom
of abdicating all rule-making power to the judiciary and gives to the
judiciary complete power to promulgate rules with respect to
procedural matters, the same power base is provided while more
harmonious relations prevail between the separate governmental
branches.6 s
65. Id. at 151-52, quotingfrom Burton v. Mayer, 275 Ky. 263, 267, 118 S.W.2d
547, 549 (1938).
66. 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.3d 863 (1958).
67. Id. at 232, 140 A.2d at 869 (emphasis added); see also, Heiberger v. Clark, 148
Conn. 177, 169 A.2d 652 (1961).
68. See Allen Steel Supply Co. v. Bradley, 89 Idaho 29, 402 P.2d 394 (1965) [where
the legislature was held to have abdicated its rule-making power "'[in order to remove

any conflict which would inevitably result from both the Legislature and the Supreme
'" 89 Idaho at 43-44, (on motion for
Court promulgating rules of procedure ....
remittitur), quotingfrom State ex rel. Blood v. Gibson Circuit Court, 239 Ind. 394,400,
157 N.E.2d 475, 478 (1959)].
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F. Constructionand Waiver
In Perry v. Minit Saver Food Stores of South Carolina,Inc."9 the
South Carolina Supreme Court enunciated a clear rule of construction
to be applied to rules of court.
It is the settled law in this state that where the terms of a
statute are clear and free of ambiguity there is no room for
construction and the courts are required to apply such according
to their literal meaning. . . . We know of no sound reason why
this principle should not apply to a court rule as well as to a
statute.70
The rule announced has the advantage, first, of simplicity of
application and, second, of having a parallel rule as to construction of
statutes which should prove useful by analogy in cases of difficult rule
construction.
Finally, while court rules of procedure are designed to facilitate
and aid the prompt and efficient administration of justice and should
not be used in a super-technical sense to do an injustice, waiver of court
rules provides an escape route for the dilatory and negligent attorney.
For this reason the sounder rule-both from a standpoint of
administrative efficacy and judicial policy-is that reiterated by the
North Carolina court in State v. Kirby.7
The Rules of the Supreme Court have been dictated by
experience and stem from a desire to expedite the public business.
They are designed to enable the court to grasp more quickly the
questions involved and to help it follow the assignments of counsel
more intelligently. These rules are mandatory and will be
72

enforced.

69. 255 S.C. 42, 177 S.E.2d 4 (1970).
70. Id. at 45, 177 S.E.2d at 4-5.
71. 276 N.C. 123, 171 S.E.2d 416 (1970).
72. 171 S.E.2d at 421. See also Balint v. Grayson, 256 N.C. 490, 124 S.E.2d 364
(1962). Speaking to the problems of local custom supplanting rules of court the Florida
court well stated the applicable policy considerations:
The orderly and efficient administration of justice compels the
observance of rules of procedure to the end that aside from the interests of

the parties litigant, the bench and bar may not be properly subjected to
public scorn for the law's delay. As wholesome and desirable as any local

custom may be to a happy rapport between members of the bar, they do
not supersede the rules of practice and cannot be relied on to excuse the

observance thereof.
Citizens Cas. Co. of New York v. Oaks, 167 So. 2d 233, 234 (Fla. 1964).
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Under such a rule, waiver within the discretion of a court should be
available only upon a showing of good cause why compliance with the
rule could not be timely had.
G. Sanctions
In People v. Mattson73 the court stated:
[I]t is the duty of the court to safeguard and promote the orderly

and expeditious conduct of its business and to guard against inept
procedures and unnecessary indulgences which would tend to

hinder, hamper or delay the conduct and dispatch of its
proceedings. 71

Pursuant to this duty, a court faced with a violation of or failure to
comply with a rule of court must have some sanction to use against the
dilatory attorney or party. The contempt proceeding is the sanction
most commonly recognized and used where enforcement by sanction is
necessary. 75 Where a sound and continuing educational program which
discusses and debates current and proposed rules and rule changes is
available both at the law school level and at the bar association level,
the necessity for other than infrequent resort to legal sanctions should
be rare.
III. CONCLUSION
Under federal and state constitutions the right to a "speedy" trial
is guaranteed to every citizen. 76 The constitution guarantees the right;
the citizenry demands the right 77-the judiciary must see to it that a
73. 51 Calif. 2d 777, 336 P.2d 937 (1959).
74. 336 P.2d at 948.
75. Pittman v. District Court, 149 Colo. 380, 369 P.2d 85 (1962); Cantillon v.
Superior Court, 150 Calif. App. 2d 184, 309 P.2d 890 (1957).
76. S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 15.
77. In his State of the State address delivered to the South Carolina General
Assembly on January 27, 1971, Governor John C. West said:
In these days of new and growing pressures on our system of criminal
justice, there must be no compromise in South Carolina with the principle
that justice must be fairly and swiftly administered. To that end, I
recommend that full administrative control of our state courts be placed in
the hands of the Chief Justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court, said
[sic] that he or his administrative assistant b authorized to take whatever
action is necessary to provide immediate trials of cases, both criminal and
civil. Believing that the prospect of a speedy trial and certain punishment is
a major deterrent to a prospective lawbreaker, I recommend that we
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speedy trial in all cases, both civil and criminal,78 is provided to every
person who becomes involved in the judicial process.
The rule-making power-whether inherent, constitutional, or
statutory-is the power by which and through which the judiciary can
act to improve and better the judicial process. Alone, the rule-making
power is of minimal value; but, as part of an integrated and
coordinated movement among all members of the legal
profession -with cooperation with and from the legislative and the
executive branches of government-the rule-making power becomes a
singularly appropriate catalyst towards a sounder judicial model.
The goal-an improved judicial process; the tool-judicial
ad ministration; the power-the judicial rule-making power.
FRANK H. GIBBES, III

establish a legislative mandate that every person accused of a crime be tried
within 60 days after his indictment and that any appeals be disposed of
expeditiously. The office of solicitor should also become a full time
position.
The State, Jan. 28, 1971, § D at 1.
78. Davis v. Whitlock, 90 S.C. 233, 73 S.E. 171 (1911).
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